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1. Introduction: The 
Importance of Philosophy  
of Religion
The importance of philoso‑
phy of religion in contemporary 
discussions is both manifold and 
simple. It is manifold, because ‘re‑
ligion’ is a complex phenomenon 
with a long history and a future 
open to often unforeseeable de‑
velopments. Even in the context 
of secularization we see that the 
old notion of religion finds sur‑
prisingly new forms of appear‑
ance, forms which influence con‑
temporary society, culture, and 
politics.2 And the importance of 
philosophy of religion is simple, 
 1 An earlier version of this text was presented at the international conference organized in ho‑
nor of Prof. Josef Seifert in 2015 in Granada, Spain. The present text contains some important mo‑
difications missing in the earlier one.
 2 Cf. Charles Taylor’s views on the importance of some form of religiousness in his monumental 
A Secular Age of 2007. See also his lecture Master Narratives of Modernity (delivered on October 21, 
2008) the same subject matter available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m95ck7A2Ooc
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because the simple fact in religion is the self‑ revelation of the totally dif‑
ferent and its relation to us.3 Philosophy, properly speaking, has always 
been the endeavor to conceive the totally different or perhaps even to con‑
ceive the impossibility of such a conception. Yet such an understanding 
of impossibility is the richest source of philosophical reflection.
In what follows I will focus on the importance of Catholic philosophy, 
that is, the specifically Catholic approach to the fundamental reality of 
religion. I shall also offer a list of models describing the possible relation‑
ships between Catholicism and philosophy. I identify the unity model as 
a model connected to phenomenological realism; and I will detail the im‑
portant contribution of Josef Seifert to such a phenomenological realism.
2. Catholicism and Philosophy
Historically, philosophy has always been an important part of Catho‑
licism; in some periods it played a more, in others a less important role. 
The critical rejection of a certain understanding of philosophy, present 
in one verse of the New Testament (Col 2:8),4 is compensated by other 
loci where Greek philosophy is put into a favorable light. Such is, for in‑
stance, St. Paul’s sermon to the philosophers on the Areopagus. His most 
famous sentence is this:
For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own 
poets have said, for we are also his offspring. (Acts 17:28)
This notion expresses a philosophical theology related to Platonism 
and Stoicism; and even the mention of the resurrection of the dead in 
Acts 17:31 recalls Plato’s ‘Phoenician story’ about human beings nurtured 
 3 Cf. B. M. Mezei, Religion and Revelation after Auschwitz, New York 2013, Part 2.
 4 The important elements of this ‘philosophy’ are ‘vain deceit,’ ‘the tradition of men,’ ‘the ru‑
diments of the world,’ and the denial of Christ. Yet philosophy is not forced to be deceitful, fol‑
low some narrow traditions, be empirically oriented, and need not deny the crucial importance of 
Christianity.
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in the womb of the earth and born of it when their time is come.5 Clement 
of Alexandria, nevertheless, did not find many followers with his view that 
philosophy, and not only the Old Testament, was a lodestar (‘paidago‑
gos’) leading mankind to Christ. The early Fathers certainly knew Greek 
philosophy well and used its results in many ways, but refused to attri‑
bute to it a sacramental role similar to the Old Testament writings. Still, 
most of the central terms of Patristic theology remain incomprehensible 
without a sufficient knowledge of then contemporary philosophical dis‑
cussions. Philosophy, especially Middle and Late Platonism was indeed 
the background of the language, culture, and general philosophical ori‑
entation of the Fathers.6
Many of the Patristic writings indicate, nevertheless, that their authors 
were not familiar with the sources of Greek philosophy as we know these 
sources today. For instance, St. Augustine’s criticism of ‘philosophy,’ es‑
pecially Platonism, shows that the judgment of the holy bishop was not 
based on the study of original texts but rather on popular summaries; 
still, a genius like St. Augustine could grasp the important points which 
he did not only criticize but, in some respects, praised as well. What es‑
caped his attention escaped the attention of many till today: namely the 
fact that philosophy in its popular forms was merely a façade of a deeper 
knowledge, a closed tradition of universal vision originating in Hellenistic 
syncretism.
In this perspective, philosophy was seen as “a gift from the gods to the 
mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed.”7 
Christian theology divided this ‘gift from the gods’ into theology as the 
 5 Plato, Republic 414 c‑ e, in: Plato, The Complete Works, ed.  J. M. Cooper, Indianapolis–
Cambridge1997, p. 1050.
 6 Cf. Gal 3:24; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, in: The Ante‑ Nicene Fathers, New York 1913, 
p. 305.
 7 Plato, Timaeus 47 b, in: Plato, The Complete Works, op. cit., p. 1250. Characteristically, this met‑
aphorical description of philosophy as a ‘gift’ (ἀγαθόν) figures in a text which describes the Ptolemaic 
cosmos in a theologically meaningful way, in a way I termed ‘cosmo‑ theological’ (B. M. Mezei, Religion 
and Revelation after Auschwitz, New York 2013, p. 34 sq.), thereby making obvious the close con‑
nection of philosophy to the intricate experience of the universe by ancient humanity. See also my 
piece Demythologizing Christian Philosophy: An Outline, “Logos i Ethos” 2013 nr 2 (35), p. 109–146.
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doctrine of divine gift per se; and into philosophy as the natural way 
of the human mind to prepare itself for the divine gift of theology. The 
Christian notion was thus in more than one way an organic enlargement 
of the earlier understanding of the importance of philosophy.
Following the Protestant historical criticism of the nineteenth century, 
Patristic Christianity was seen for a long time as a synthesis of Hellenism 
and Judaism on the basis of spiritual movements related to the Gospel. 
Underlying this idea there is the presupposition that Hellenism and Judaism 
constitute historical and cultural antipodes. A synthesis of Hellenism and 
Mosaic faith, accordingly, had to be a strained endeavor. Nevertheless, such 
a sharp opposition between Old Testament faith and Hellenism is an exag‑
geration; the process of the unification of the Old Testament faith cannot 
be considered isolated from the general cultural processes of the neigh‑
boring peoples living around the Mediterraneum. The more we approach 
the beginning of our epoch, the less such a sharp separation appears re‑
alistic. From our perspective today, it is not the difference that is striking 
between religious forms of those times, but rather their close similarity.
Pope Benedict XVI, therefore, rightly calls our attention to the im‑
portance Hellenism played in the formation of Christianity.8 If philoso‑
phy is considered the highest intellectual expression of Hellenism – and 
I have in mind especially the Platonic corpus as inherited from the school 
of Thrasyllus of Alexandria – then philosophy indeed contributed to the 
emergence of the intellectual building of Christianity during the first six 
centuries. Catholicism is not popular Platonism, as for instance Franz 
Brentano believed, but Catholicism used in many ways the Platonic un‑
derstanding of reality in the shaping of its doctrinal, moral, and liturgical 
contents. St. Augustine’s theological understanding is clearly influenced 
not only by mystical experiences, but also by the Neo‑ Platonism of his 
intellectual circles. Augustinianism has been the most important vehicle 
of transmitting Platonic and Neo‑ Platonic influences in the West: Duns 
Scotus, Bonaventure, Malebranche, Fénelon, or – to mention a more 
 8 Cf. Benedict XIV, Pope, Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Benedict XVI to München, Altötting 
and Regensburg (September 9–14, 2006); see also the bibliography at the end of this text.
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recent example – Eric Przywara are excellent representatives of this claim. 
Classical phenomenology was seen already at the turn of the last century 
as a revival of Platonic and Augustinian thought.9
Platonism characterized the first millennium of the history of the 
church; in a similar way, St. Thomas Aquinas’ reception of the thought 
of Aristotle had a lasting influence on the second millennium. Thomas 
needed to have not only the talent of a philosophical and theological ge‑
nius to work out his summae, but an intellectual courage as well. Thomas 
was aware of the opposition of traditionalist theologians who found the 
then new Aristotelian rationalism threatening to the integrity of faith. 
Still, Thomas kept working on his great contributions which synthesized 
Augustinian Platonism, Dionysian theology, and Aristotelian science. 
Aristotelianism, as it were, was the Zeitgeist of the thirteenth century; 
Thomas Aquinas responded to the new interest with his great works.
Besides his personal and philosophical courage, it is centrally impor‑
tant to see that Thomas Aquinas was able to create a synthesis of divergent 
traditions. In a certain way, Thomas incorporated Aristotelian science into 
Christianity; in another way, however, he synthesized the authority of 
Pseudo‑ Dionysius with the freedom of the questioning mind. He did not 
only summarize points of view and did not only formulate the Christian 
standpoint but fundamentally contributed to a new understanding of re‑
ality, personhood, and God with his theological and philosophical solu‑
tions. By creating such intellectual masterpieces, Thomas contributed to 
the emergence of the West as an autonomous cultural power.
In the historical evolution of the relationship between Catholicism 
and philosophy, some important improvements have to be mentioned. 
Renaissance Platonism contributed to the diminishing of the grasp of 
Aristotelian science on theology and prepared the way to Protestant 
Reformation in which Augustinianism had an important role to play. 
The influence of Platonism was mirrored in the new, mathematical‑ 
geometrical ideal of philosophy which came to the fore especially in the 
works of Descartes and his followers. Rationalism in general, however, 
 9 Cf. J. Hessen, Religionsphilosophie, Vols 1–2, München–Basel 1948.
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proved to be a closer ally of intellectual Catholicism than it initially ap‑
peared, for it was intimately related to the scientific mind of an Aristotelian 
understanding of reality. The theological rationalism of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was at the same time abstractly Platonic and 
analytically Aristotelian.
Catholic Romanticism, in which Clemens Brentano (the uncle of Franz 
Brentano) played a crucial role, was the appropriate framework in which 
some of the achievements of the new German philosophers could have 
been integrated. Kant and his most important followers attempted to over‑
come the difficulties caused by skepticism and dogmatism in philosophy. 
They hoped to be able to contribute to a new understanding of faith as 
well. Even Kant himself wished to make place for faith – while destroy‑
ing fundamental pillars of a locally empirical view of reality. German 
idealism, nevertheless, influenced Catholic philosophy in a number of 
ways, so much so that some decades later new patterns of the relation‑
ship between philosophy and Catholicism became possible especially in 
the works of the theologians belonging to the Catholic Tübingen School 
(such as Johann Sebastian von Drey or Johann Adam Möhler). In such 
patterns, a strong criticism of a number of views of the German ideal‑
ists was counterbalanced by the use of their other views for the benefit of 
a new philosophical understanding of Catholic Christianity.
Many of the important Catholic thinkers of the twentieth century – 
from Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand to Joseph Maréchal, Karl 
Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar – not only criticized certain tenets of 
German idealism, but used important insights of the same current to de‑
velop a new form of philosophical Catholicism.10 In these developments, 
the relationship between philosophy and Catholicism was again revitali‑
zed and elaborated into new and synthetic forms of thinking. The general 
 10 In fact, many of the prominent German theologians today, from Hans Küng through Johann 
Baptist Metz to Pope Benedict XVI, show not only an intimate knowledge of the great German phi‑
losophers from Leibniz and Kant to Heidegger, Gadamer and Habermas, but also a deep under‑
standing of the theological and philosophical significance of the problems and methods these au‑
thors addressed and used. Just as St. John Paul II, Benedict XVI is well‑ versed in German philosophy 
which is shown in many of his writings.
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thesis of this historical summary – forced on the basis of the latest de‑
velopment of the twentieth and twenty‑ first centuries. Specific attention 
is to be given to realist phenomenology which I shall consider below.
The promising rise of Neo‑ Thomism and Neo‑ Scholasticism from the 
second half of the nineteenth century created a new impetus in the un‑
derstanding of the relationship between Catholicism and philosophy. This 
new philosophy dispensed with the framework of Catholic Romanticism 
and preferred a more down‑ to‑ earth realism. Such a realism, nevertheless, 
constituted a sharp opposition with the philosophy of the Patristic age, an 
opposition twentieth century theologians began to realize.
On the other hand, even in the new Catholic realism, a more complex 
epistemology emerged. Matteo Liberatore for instance contributed not only 
to the acceptance of Neo‑ Thomism as the official philosophy of the church 
but worked out philosophical doctrines influential in his time, such as the 
notion of the ‘direct universal’ (universale directum) as distinct from the ‘re‑
flected universal’ (universale reflexum). According to Liberatore, the direct 
universal exists in reality and not only in the mind, such as for instance the 
direct universal of a quidditas or a ‘human being.’ A direct universal can 
be intuited and determined without reference to a particular individual, 
for instance when we directly perceive that a human being is by definition 
a living being. The notion of the direct universal influenced the emerg‑
ing philosophies of value, Franz Brentano’s notion of ‘inner perception’ 
of intentionality, and also the ‘categorical intuition’ of the early Husserl.11
As a consequence of the encyclical letter Aeterni patris of 1879, the 
most influential Catholic theologians of the twentieth century, and 
a number of the most important philosophers as well, received and pro‑
cessed the various aspects of Thomism. Even such authors as Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Russell or Sartre showed traces of the Thomistic 
revival in their works.12
 11 For more details see Liberatore, Matthaeus, Institutiones philosophicae, Romae 1857, 244 sq.
 12 There are many ways one can demonstrate this influence but the best example, in my view, 
is offered by Eric Przywara whose works show the deep and organic connections between Neo‑
‑Thomism and twentieth century philosophy.
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In Catholicism, the decisive importance of Neo‑ Thomism became 
counterbalanced by a number of other interests coming to the fore from 
the 1930s, and especially after the Second Vatican Council. Pope John 
Paul II’s Fides et ratio of 1998 – the second encyclical letter on philosophy 
ever written by a pope – shows a variety of way as to how the priority of 
Thomistic thinking can be completed by ideas of German idealism, phe‑
nomenology, and existentialism. Fides et ratio goes beyond the horizon 
of Thomism and opens the way to a new evaluation of the relationship 
between Catholicism and philosophy.
On the contemporary scene, a philosophy of religion of Catholic ori‑
entation has become especially significant. Let me mention just the most 
influential movements:
• The ‘theological turn of French phenomenology’ (Dominique 
Janicaud’s expression) which originates in Lévinas’ critical response to 
Heidegger’s thought;
• Analytical Thomism or analytical theology, especially the works of 
US and UK philosophers (Michael Rea or John Haldane);
• The Radical Orthodoxy movement (John Milbank) – there belongs 
to this movement such ramifications as the anti‑ Gnostic polemics of 
Cyril O’Regan;
• We need to mention the world‑ wide influence of the thought of 
Josef Seifert, that is, his realist phenomenology.13
Before I offer a substantive evaluation of some of these developments, 
let me outline a theoretical schema.
3. Models of Relationship
On the basis of the above summary I offer a list of models of the rela‑
tionship between Catholicism and philosophy. There are two perspectives 
 13 Perhaps not comparable to the influence of the schools just mentioned, we still may refer 
to the work of the Fides et ratio Research Group at Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Hungary 
which has already arranged a number of successful conferences, takes part in the publication of 
book series and contributes to important publications by Bloomsbury Academic Press and Oxford 
University Press.
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in which we can speak of models here: either from the point of view of 
philosophy, or from that of Catholicism. The list of the models I offer can 
be understood in both ways.
The models are as follows:
1. The Model of Hidden Presence (philosophy is latent in Catholicism 
and vice versa);
2. The Model of Supremacy (one of the two factors is considered to 
be more important than the other one);
3. The Model of Fulfillment (one of the factors is considered as the 
fulfillment of the other one);
4. The Model of Partnership (the factors form some kind of a corre‑
lation);
5. The Model of Challenge (the factors exert a critical function with 
respect to each other);
6. The Model of Proleptic Significance (either of the two factors is 
considered in terms of a proleptic significance for the other, that is as 
representative of insights crucial in the proper functioning of the other 
factor).
In Model 1, one of the factors is the determining perspective in which 
the other factor is envisioned. Philosophy, as historical analysis shows, 
offered for a long time such a perspective. Greek philosophical termi‑
nology was used abundantly in the making of the Christian doctrines. 
On the other hand, it is often said that a certain philosophical concep‑
tion is based on its underlying, inexplicit notion of the absolute, God. In 
such cases, this underlying notion forms the perspective in which phi‑
losophy is conceived.
In Model 2, one of the factors, philosophy or Catholicism, is used as 
a means to reach a certain unity. When philosophy is considered ‘the ser‑
vant of theology,’ ancilla theologiae, it is Model 2 we apply. Christianity, 
however, can be used as a means in a philosophical conception, as for 
instance the notion of the Trinity, or at least some interpretation of it, 
determines the entire structure of Hegel’s thought.
In Model 3, either of the two factors is understood to be the fulfill‑
ment of the other. In the traditional conception, philosophy is fulfilled 
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in theology, reason in faith, pagan thought and Old Testament prepara‑
tion in the revelation of Christ. Catholic Christianity considered itself as 
the fulfillment of the history of humanity, for Jesus Christ arrived at the 
‘fullness of times.’ On the other hand, there are views which claim that 
Christianity was merely instrumental to a higher level of philosophical 
awareness, to a new philosophy of rationalism, idealism, existentialism, 
or some kind of a theological phenomenology.
In Model 4, philosophy and Catholicism are perceived as mutually 
supporting each other. This can be done either by rejecting to arrange 
them into a hierarchy or else by emphasizing the many dimensions in 
which philosophy or theology respectively has a higher importance. As 
a general principle it is maintained in this model that philosophy and 
Catholicism are mutually supportive of each other in various fields; thus 
it is the supporting element that is stressed in their relationship.
Model 5, however, emphasizes the mutual challenges philosophy and 
theology prepare for each other. Philosophy is seen here as critical of the‑
ology, for instance in the works of Hegel or Heidegger; and theology is 
considered as critical of philosophy, such as in the work of Karl Barth or 
Hans Urs von Balthasar. This critical view can be conceived in extreme 
terms as a mutual exclusion. This happens in fideism, or in straightfor‑
ward atheism, existential atheism, or in some forms of idealism.
Model 6 describes the relationship of the two factors in terms of in‑
trinsic importance for each other. By ‘intrinsic importance’ I mean the 
essential contribution without which none of the two factors, philoso‑
phy or Catholicism, is capable of performing its proper function. The 
most important form of such a contribution is the emphasis on the lim‑
its of the other factors in a well‑ defined sense. Thus, Catholicism as the 
most general form of religious faith and practice calls our attention to 
the limits of philosophical autonomy in the intellectual and moral sens‑
es. On the other hand, philosophy by its analytic and synthetic capabili‑
ties is apt to point out the importance of paying appropriate attention 
to new developments in culture, the sciences, and in the history of soci‑
eties. Philosophy, in the present sense, is capable of offering a historical 
criticism of theology not only by pointing out the semantic changes of 
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fundamental theological notions, but also by raising the overall question 
of the meaning of theology as such.
I call this model the model of proleptic significance, since philosophy, 
thus conceived, is able to point out the importance of the rethinking and 
restructuring of traditional conceptions in view of the actual changes in 
our world. Philosophy has a proleptic role in the more natural sense as 
well that it points to our current developments in the world of culture, 
society and the sciences, which are becoming important for Catholicism 
in general and for theology in particular. Philosophy, by fulfilling its pro‑
leptic role, identifies the weakening plausibility of theological notions in 
technological societies and prepares an overall renewal of religion.
On the other hand, Catholicism can play a similarly proleptic role 
with respect to philosophy. Philosophy has the tendency to conceive of 
human knowledge as the absolute point of reference in understanding 
reality. Nevertheless, no form of knowledge is able to escape the circle of 
presupposing the validity of its mode of knowledge; and thus no philoso‑
phy is able to make itself thematic as philosophy in its entirety. Philosophy 
points beyond itself; or to put it differently, philosophy shows its own 
heteronomy. Catholicism as a form of religion with faith in its center, or 
theology in the narrower sense with its emphasis on an ultimately het‑
eronomous realm, can help philosophy to recognize its own limitations. 
Catholicism can assist philosophy in looking forward to new types of 
thinking beyond the traditional types of philosophical knowledge, such 
as the type I identify as a non‑ standard philosophical theology conceiv‑
ing and explaining the importance of an apocalyptic phenomenology.14
It is almost needless to say that the present overview would not be 
possible without the perspective of philosophy in itself and in its pro‑
leptic significance. Catholicism has never aspired to eliminate the role 
of philosophy from its realms, while other Christianity‑ based currents, 
such as the thought of Karl Barth, rejected any role of philosophy in the 
structure and content of theology. However, even Barth himself applied 
 14 See my forthcoming work entitled Radical Revelation: A Philosophical Approach, in which 
my method is described as a ‘non‑ standard philosophical theology.’
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sophisticated philosophical methods in his writings. Not even an aes‑
thetic detour, such as offered by Hans Urs von Balthasar, can overlook 
the important role of philosophy in the logical and structural workings 
of a theological system. A summary analyzing the relationship between 
faith and reason or Catholicism and philosophy cannot be properly real‑
ized if not in the perspective of a philosophical approach – always with 
due attention to the proleptic role of Catholicism.
4. The Unity of Models
Which model shall we accept as an appropriate description of the rela‑
tionship between philosophy and Catholicism? In some accounts one or 
the other model is declared to be the only solution. In my view, it is more 
promising to unify these models into a single one. I term this model the 
unity model. Philosophy and Catholicism, variously conceived, can be 
envisioned as being related to one another in terms of perspective, su‑
premacy, fulfillment, partnership, challenge, and proleptic significance. 
The guiding principle of such unity is that the validity of one model can‑
not be stretched beyond the limits of the validity of the other models. That 
is to say, philosophy can be seen as the perspective in which Christianity 
was conceived in the world of Hellenism, but this does not mean that 
Christianity did not become the perspective in which philosophy came 
to understand itself during the centuries of Christianity. The other mod‑
els can be combined into a single whole in a similar way.
The unity model is that of the dynamic unity of these particular rela‑
tionships, a dynamism which is simultaneously historical and conceptual, 
cultural, and scientific. By dynamism I especially mean that, in certain 
ages, some of the particular relationships come to the fore. In our age 
I believe that the features of partnership and proleptic significance are 
particularly important. It is through partnership and proleptic signifi‑
cance that we may have the appropriate view of the unified relationship 
between Catholicism and philosophy.
The unity model, thus, is present to us in these particular features; 
which is not to say that I deny the relative importance of the other fea‑
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tures. Nevertheless, in earlier ages it was important to stress the point 
of the general priority of theology over philosophy. While the essen‑
tial relationship between philosophy and theology do not change, there 
are periods in which philosophy has a particular significance, such as 
in the age of the First Scholasticism. Similarly, in our age, philosophy in 
the proper sense has a special relationship to theology, in particular 
to the central questions of faith, as is shown by the intense reflections 
of leading theologians throughout the twentieth century. Today, in ac‑
cordance with the radically altered situation in culture and science, it 
appears more prudent to emphasize the model of partnership and pro‑
leptic significance.
5. The Unity Model and Phenomenological Realism
Realist phenomenology emerged as a reaction to the insufficient and 
often misleading formulations of Husserlian phenomenology with respect 
to the exact nature and relationship of the two dimensions of reality, mind 
and world. For Husserl, mind is centrally the transcendental ego, that is, 
the ego postulated by empirical experiences; the world is an aspect or 
dimension of this ego. This position is called transcendental idealism by 
Husserl. This idealism, however, cannot properly answer the question of 
the being of the mind or the ego, as was recognized and formulated for 
the first time by Max Scheler in an influential way.15
The two main focusses of realist phenomenology are the source of all 
essences, that is God, and the corresponding essence of human persons. 
These centers form a latent whole in realist phenomenology; whenever 
we speak of God in this perspective, we speak of human personhood 
as well, because the human and the divine are integrated by the com‑
mon realm of personhood. However, human personhood is finite and 
divine personhood is infinite. Nonetheless, precisely this relation be‑
tween finite and infinite personhood creates the core of reality as con‑
ceived by realist phenomenology. This core, however, is viewed not in 
 15 Cf. M. Scheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Berlin 1933, p. 122.
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itself but rather in the perspective of pure perfections, that is to say, 
through perfections which are predicated univocally of God and the 
world. While focusing on the community of pure or simple perfections, 
realist phenomenology emphasizes the infinite difference between di‑
vine and human personhood. However, to emphasize such a difference 
is to emphasize the ultimately unique kind of relationship between the 
infinite and the finite, a relationship traditionally described by the no‑
tion of the analogy of being.
Let me introduce here an expression, ‘phenomenological realism’ as an 
alternative to realist phenomenology. Realist phenomenology is an ana‑
lytical understanding of the phenomena with a very strong emphasis on 
their individual character and, to some extent, their specific connections 
to one another. Necessarily, such an emphasis goes hand in hand with an 
understanding of reality which considers the substance more important 
than the relation. However, relations are also very important and it is es‑
pecially the overall relational character of reality as such that is more fun‑
damental than any specific or individual moment belonging to any layer 
of reality as a whole. It appears to be a change of emphasis that I stress 
the notion of reality as a whole in its entangled character. However, this 
understanding of reality leads us to a different understanding of the role 
of the subject of this reality as well, inasmuch as the subject is part and 
parcel – or even the par excellence expression – of the entangled charac‑
ter of reality. This latter understanding of reality can be described in the 
form I term phenomenological realism.
Phenomenological realism is realism in an organic way: in the way in 
which realist phenomenology needs to conceive the community of divine 
and human personhood. In this sense, phenomenological realism can be 
termed entangled realism. This realism is not interested in the first place 
in the specific features of reality but in reality as a whole with its overall 
structures of synthesis. Phenomenological or entangled realism asks the 
question of the origin and nature of what is real in our world and mind; 
and while realist phenomenology points out the aspectual nature of ev‑
eryday reality, phenomenological realism stresses the importance of the 
ultimate character of what is real.
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Husserl famously criticized the expression of ‘transcendental realism.’16 
Phenomenological realism, however, is about the phenomenological re‑
ality of the intentional; and the question here concerns precisely the na‑
ture of that realness of phenomenological reality, a realness which is 
‘entangled,’ that is, correlational.17 Just as in realist phenomenology, in 
phenomenological realism the center is described by the relationship be‑
tween human and divine personhood. In a modified way, however, phe‑
nomenological realism attempts to conceive reality as at the same time 
fulfilled and open; it is open as human personhood shows openness to 
divine personhood, and divine personhood as a ‘pure act’ is necessarily 
infinite personhood. In personhood as such, we find the feature of self‑ 
transcendence, openness, or disclosure; and as ultimately real, person‑
hood appears here as a reality deeply entangled with divine personhood.
Accordingly, ‘reality’ in phenomenological realism is open reality 
which shows a certain development throughout history. Pheno meno‑
logical realism is aware of the role of historical change and the signifi‑
cance of the historical trajectory of our personhood and various notions 
of personhood. Similarly, the notion of reality changes throughout his‑
tory as shown for instance if we compare the Greek notion of phusis and 
our contemporary notion of ‘physical reality.’ Thus it is a paramount task 
of phenomenological realism to show the main phases and direction of 
these changes; to show that reality is a process of stemming from, and 
culminating in, God’s ultimate reality. Reality is not dissolved thereby 
in relativism but displays a network of relations, structures, and their 
characteristic and meaningful alterations.
Phenomenological realism, however, adds an important dimension 
to the earlier notions of reality: it considers reality not only in its present 
 16 Cf. Cartesian meditations, Hua I, p. 63, 121; in the 1960 English translation p. 24, 89.
 17 When I apply the adverb ‘entangled’ here I am aware of the phenomenon of entanglement 
in quantum experiments, a phenomenon which is not yet understood well enough to build on it 
a metaphysical corollary. Yet entanglement in the sense of correlation is crucial in the proper un‑
derstanding of reality in phenomenological realism and this importance may be reflected in the sur‑
prising phenomena of quantum entanglement as shown for instance recently by The Big Bell Test 
(see http://thebigbelltest.org/#/home?l=EN ).
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situation as the process of the disintegration of an earlier form but at the 
same time as already containing the germs of an emerging new form of 
reality and its understanding. This proleptic feature of phenomenological 
realism is to some extent characteristic of other works of a similar sort, 
such as Przywara’s notion of being as universal rhythm; or Heidegger’s 
notion of the dynamic character of being or Seyn (often translated as 
Be‑ ing). In phenomenological or organic realism, a systematic model of 
proleptic significance can be realized as an expression of the openness 
of human thinking to newness realized in the future.18
6. The Work of Josef Seifert
Josef Seifert is the most important representative of realist phenom‑
enology; it is almost impossible to do justice to the immense importance 
of his work in just one section of a general paper. Still I wish to contextu‑
alize his thought in the present outline. Seifert was a disciple of Dietrich 
von Hildebrand and considers his mentor one of the most important 
figures in the history of philosophy. It is especially due to the theory of 
values of Hildebrand that Seifert attributes to this thinker such an im‑
portant role in the history of thought. On the other hand, Hildebrand’s 
engaged Catholicism has been exemplary for Seifert; in Seifert’s philoso‑
phy of values, the Catholic notion of reality as a realm of a hierarchy of 
essences plays an important role. The ultimate focus of values is person‑
hood: the dignity and values of human persons and the infinite dignity 
of a personal God which he holds to be accessible to human reason, not 
only to faith; the notion of person as developed throughout the centuries 
culminates in this philosophy in the notion of a human person as intrin‑
sically related to the divine personhood.
If we want to understand the expression of ‘realist phenomenology,’ we 
need to consider both terms in a thoroughgoing way. Seifertian thought 
is phenomenological, because it emphasizes the role of essences or values 
as directly given to our intuition. It is a phenomenological philosophy 
 18 Cf. B. M. Mezei, Radical Revelation: A Philosophical Approach, New York 2017 (forth coming).
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also because the individual essences given in our intuition form a hier‑
archy, an integral and meaningful structure; on the top of this hierarchy 
there is the divine essence as the perfect fulfillment and the origin of all 
values. There is thus an intuition of the divine essence, although a finite 
being cannot fully conceive that essence. The intuitive knowledge of the 
irreducible divine essence is the central moment of Seifert’s defense of 
the ontological proof for the existence of God; and it is similarly central 
in his personalistic interpretation of the five ways of Thomas Aquinas 
and the specific personalistic proofs of God’s existence.19 Divine person‑
hood becomes accessible in an indirect way for human beings: not only 
in positive divine revelation and in the doctrines of the church, or in the 
life of paramount personalities, such as great saints and exceptionally 
wise people, but also in the ‘mirror of the world’ that allows us to intuit 
the essence of eternity: the first uncaused cause and the necessary exis‑
tence of God in the intelligible mirror of the chains of finite causes and 
contingent existents, or again in our moral and intellectual experiences 
and intuitions which disclose to us the supreme and infinite divine real‑
ity of personal pure perfections.20
Seifertian thought nevertheless is termed realist phenomenology re‑
ferring to the realism of ancient but also of specifically Christian and 
Catholic philosophy. Seifert considers especially the Augustinian form of 
realism significant. In this conception of reality, the unity of being is un‑
derstood along the lines of an analogy between the creator and the creat‑
ed, the model and its replica. Thus Seifert’s realism considers divine being 
as the principal form of reality entirely distinct from, and transcendent 
to, the world, yet cognizable from the world and the human person and 
united with the world in many ways including analogy as an authentic 
form of metaphysical similarity: the ‘pure perfections’ whose ratio for‑
malis exists both in the world and, infinitely more properly, in God. The 
created world, and especially finite human persons are not related to an 
 19 J. Seifert, Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott, Bonn 2010.
 20 Cf. J. Seifert, Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica 
e personalistica, Milano 1989.
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empty transcendence as a wholly unknown and unknowable ‘X,’ but are 
truly similar to God and allow us to perceive in their mirror the arche‑
typical personal perfections of God. This realism may also be termed 
value realism, since it is the realm of values which constitutes the cohe‑
sive structure or, in a sense even more than reality and intelligibility, the 
most intimate dimension of beings.
Seifertian phenomenology, thus, has two important features: First, 
reality is fundamentally divine; in its supreme unity it contains all pure 
perfections in which created reality takes part or which it exemplifies 
in a finite way. Second, human personhood stands in an intrinsic rela‑
tionship to divine personhood and expresses divine reality in the high‑
est level possible for a finite being. In other words, realist phenomenol‑
ogy is realist personalism, or to put it in a simpler way, personalism in 
a simple sense.
The most important aspect of Seifertian thought is his understanding 
of reality as integral being. His Augustinian ontology differs from a form 
of realism in which the notion of analogy is based on nearly incompa‑
rable natures of the finite and the infinite. Realist thought, in most of its 
contemporary forms, suggests the primacy of external reality as given to 
the senses; empirical reality is the touchstone of our knowledge of the 
real and the unreal, and some form of verificationism is applied as the 
criterion of this difference. Seifertian realism is different from a sheer 
external realism of the physical universe and emphasizes the primacy of 
personal being. Through his further development of the metaphysics of 
pure perfections, not only the most abstract transcendental of traditional 
philosophy, but also specifically personal perfections point to the abso‑
lute perfections of God. Thus he emphasizes the unity of being: a more 
intimate and profound relationship of the finite and the infinite being, 
the finite and the infinite persons, who possesses many of the same per‑
fections, albeit man in a finite, God in an infinite form.
In the above description, I have emphasized those aspects of realist 
phenomenology which are close to phenomenological or entangled real‑
ism. However, Seifert’s thought never gets very close to entangled realism 
given his analytical emphases. Yet, in my view, realist phenomenology 
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cannot be properly assessed without the grasp of the integral under‑
standing of being. It is not only the pure perfections that create an inte‑
gral connection between various layers of being but rather being itself 
in its entangled or organic characteristic. In the Platonic‑ Augustinian 
tradition, the integral conception of being is expressed in the univer‑
sal hierarchy of essences, or in the intimate relationship between divine 
personhood and human persons. In contradistinction to a more struc‑
tured understanding of analogy or an externalist conception of objectiv‑
ity, the Augustinian view of integral being – which nevertheless reflects 
the facts of fallen nature – offers a unified conception of reality. Reality, 
thus, originates in the ultimate reality of integral being. Logically, realist 
phenomenology is dependent on such an integral understanding of re‑
ality, that is, on phenomenological realism.
If we consider the models I outlined above, it seems that some of them 
fit in with Seifertian thought. His thought emphasizes the doctrinal su‑
premacy of theology yet also the supremacy of philosophy in fundamen‑
tal theological questions (model 2); it considers philosophy as fulfilling 
theology in important ways, although, obviously, not entering dogmat‑
ic theology properly speaking (model 3). The latter is the fulfillment of 
any philosophy; yet Seifert’s philosophy fulfills fundamental theology in 
a way which leads beyond the traditional framework of theological in‑
troduction: Seifertian theological introduction has a spiritual dimension 
essential to Catholic morality in his understanding. Yet this correlation 
belongs to a rational partnership between theology and philosophy, which 
keeps the dignity of both factors (model 4). Finally, Seifertian thought 
may be a challenge for some understandings of theological introduction, 
a challenge calling for appropriate theological answers (model 5). Thus 
models 2 to 5 are exemplified in Seifertian thought, a fact which shows 
the integral character of his philosophy.
What about the model of proleptic significance? The immensity of 
the work of Josef Seifert may be a hindrance to an accurate answer to 
this question. In general, there are two basic types of philosophy: the one 
summarizes past results and even revises them; the other grasps the entire 
context of a tradition and offers a new interpretation of the whole with 
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respect to a new form of thought. Josef Seifert’s work may belong to the 
first type yet it shows features of the second type as well.
7. Consequences and Tasks
While our contemporary culture favors philosophical specialization, 
scientism, skepticism or even atheism, philosophers are well advised 
to be cautious to embrace such views without proper research. It is the 
task of philosophy to understand properly the historical shift of its own 
self‑ understanding from universal knowledge to specific analysis, from 
philosophical dialectics to logical positivism, or from a theologically in‑
terested discipline to the proponent of atheism. Not to see this history 
of various positions as belonging to a whole would be reducing philos‑
ophy to one of its aspects. Secondly, it is crucially important to under‑
stand the limits of philosophical reflection, that is, its fundamental het‑
eronomy. Thirdly, it is equally important to recognize the importance of 
philosophy in understanding heteronomy of human knowledge in the 
general sense. Fourthly, just on the basis of this heteronomy, philoso‑
phy is capable of reaching a certain insight into the reality and nature 
of genuine autonomy.
With respect to Catholicism, the following appears to be important. 
The fulfillment of the tasks of philosophy in our day makes it possible and 
even necessary to rethink the traditional tenets of Catholic Christianity, 
tenets not only philosophical but also theological in their contents. I call 
this aspect of philosophy philosophical Catholicism.21
 21 I  my forthcoming Radical Revelation, the final chapter entitled The Catholicity of 
Revelation attempts to explain the notion of a philosophical Catholicism based on historical 
Catholicism yet offering an interpretation instrumental to a philosophical renewal I am de‑
lineating in the present paper as well. Let me emphasize here only this much: Philosophical 
Catholicism has nothing to do with any kind of sectarianism or dogmatism. Rather, philosophi‑
cal Catholicism aims at the proper understanding and further development of the uniquely rich 
philosophical traditions connected to historical Catholicism both in the theological and philo‑
sophical senses.
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Philosophical Catholicism is to reflect on
• The traditional contents of Catholicism, especially of its doctrinal 
contents, inasmuch as they are accessible for philosophy, with a special 
emphasis on the notion of the Trinity;
• The historical change Catholicism has gone through with respect 
to society, culture, the sciences, and philosophy itself;
• The most acute moral and doctrinal problems of current scientific 
research from a Catholic perspective;
• The historical perspective in which Catholicism is to accomplish 
its mission;
• Its proper nature with respect to Catholicism in the form of the 
unity of models I proposed above.
The prerequisite of doing philosophy in this sense, however, is the 
community of philosophers who take their philosophical tasks most 
seriously; philosophers who give their life for the fulfillment of their 
philosophical vocation with special respect to the tasks I mentioned 
above. In such a community, some cooperation can be developed which 
brings its fruits in the realm of the relationship between philosophy and 
Catholicism. I believe that it is not only philosophy that leads to failure 
without the appropriate assistance of Catholicism; especially in our age, 
but in a general sense as well, Catholicism needs philosophy for the ful‑
fillment of its historic vocation in the realms of culture, society, and the 
sciences. The task of the third millennium of Christianity cannot be the 
mere survival, as it were, of the age of secularization; it is rather to un‑
derstand secularization as a challenge which helps us to transcend the 
earlier horizon of thinking and prepare, with all our means, the age of 
a new and overarching synthesis, the cultural synthesis of the third mil‑
lennium. Philosophy of religion, phenomenological or other, possesses 
a significance inasmuch as it proves to be instrumental to fulfilling the 
historical task of such a new synthesis.
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Abstract
Realist Phenomenology and Philosophy of Religion. 
A Critical Reflection
The aim of the present paper is to show that Catholicism is not a closed segment of 
contemporary philosophy but rather a rich source of traditions and developments which 
are alive even today and can help to understand our philosophical situation and contrib‑
ute to a renaissance of influential philosophy in our culture. In more detail, I shall focus 
on the importance of Catholic philosophy in its history and present day situation as part 
and parcel of our general philosophical traditions. I offer a list of models describing the 
possible relationships between Catholicism and philosophy. I identify the unity model as 
a model connected to phenomenological realism; and I will detail the important contri‑
bution of Josef Seifert to such a phenomenological realism. Phenomenological realism as 
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an expression is offered here as a modification of realist phenomenology, a modification 
based on the recognition of what I term the entangled nature of reality.
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and philosophy, entanglement, Josef Seifert
